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An extractor is a function E that is used to extract randomness. Given an imperfect random
source X and a uniform seed Y , the output E(X, Y ) is close to uniform. We study properties
of such functions in the presence of prior quantum information about X, with a particular focus
on cryptographic applications. We prove that certain extractors are suitable for key expansion in
the bounded storage model where the adversary has a limited amount of quantum memory. For
extractors with one-bit output we show that the extracted bit is essentially equally secure as in the
case where the adversary has classical resources. We prove the security of certain constructions that
output multiple bits in the bounded storage model.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of randomness extraction is to generate “al-
most uniform” randomness given an imperfect source of
randomness X . The term “extractor” is generally used
to describe a procedure which accomplishes this task;
more formally, an extractor is a (deterministic) function
E : X × Y → Z which, when applied to an imperfect
source X and a uniform and independent seed Y , yields
an output Z := E(X,Y ) which is close to being uniformly
distributed on Z. Such an extractor is characterized by
a number of parameters. Among these are the amount
of randomness Y that is required, the amount of ran-
domness Z produced, and, most importantly, the char-
acter of the sources X which lead to almost uniform out-
put. A very general class of sources are the weak sources
X , characterized by a lower bound on the min-entropy
H∞(X) := − logmaxx PX(x). Correspondingly, a (k, ε)-
extractor [1] commonly refers to an extractor which, for
any input distribution PX with H∞(X) ≥ k, outputs
ε-uniform randomness Z.
Besides purifying randomness, extractors are an essen-
tial tool in computer science, in particular in complexity
theory and cryptography. Correspondingly, the study of
such extractors has been a major research topic in recent
years, and much understanding has been gained (see [2]
for a review). For applications in computer science, the
challenge is to find explicit, efficiently computable extrac-
tors with good parameters.
In a cryptographic context, a certain variant of the
concept of a (k, ε)-extractor is of particular importance.
These are called strong extractors; they have the addi-
tional property that even the pair (Y,E(X,Y )) is ε-close
to uniform. This means for example that (Y,E(X,Y ))
can be used to encrypt a message M = (M1,M2) using
a one-time pad [3] as C = (C1, C2) = (M1 ⊕ Y,M2 ⊕
E(X,Y )). An adversary who learns the cipher-text C as
well as the message M1 (and thus the seed Y ) will be
completely ignorant of the content of the remaining mes-
sage M2. Expressed differently, the pair (Y,E(X,Y )) is
a key with universally composable security [4, 5].
A more striking application of strong extractors in
cryptography is privacy amplification, introduced by
Bennett, Brassard and Robert [6] and further analyzed
in [7]. This refers to a technique that allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to generate a secret key Z from a shared
random variableX about which the adversary has partial
information E. The only assumption is that the parties
are connected by an authentic but otherwise completely
insecure channel. The key Z is then obtained as follows:
Alice generates an independent uniform seed Y and sends
it over the channel. Subsequently, both parties apply a
strong extractor to get Z := E(X,Y ). The security of Z
when used as a secret key directly follows from the prop-
erties of the strong extractor, assuming a certain bound
on the information E of the adversary.
Apparently related to privacy amplification, but con-
ceptually quite different, is Maurer’s bounded storage
model [8]. The first security proof for general adversaries
in this model was obtained by Aumann, Ding and Ra-
bin [9] and essentially optimal constructions were subse-
quently found in a sequence of papers [10, 11, 12]. Its
aim is not key extraction, but key expansion. In this set-
ting a large amount of randomness X is publicly, but
only temporarily available. Alice and Bob use a previ-
ously shared (short) secret key Y to obtain additional
key bits Z = E(X,Y ) using a strong extractor. The seed
Y remains hidden to the adversary until (possibly) after
the execution of the protocol. The adversary is assumed
to have only a bounded amount of storage (which may
be much larger than the honest parties’ memory). As
a result, his information E about X is limited, once X
becomes inaccessible, and by the properties of the extrac-
tor, Z can be shown to be secure even if he later obtains
the seed Y (this was referred to as “everlasting security”
in [9]).
From a cryptographic viewpoint, a natural generaliza-
tion of these scenarios is arrived at by allowing the ad-
versary to have quantum information Q instead of only
classical information E about X . This modification is
2not merely of theoretical interest. Indeed, the only con-
struction proved to be secure [13, 14, 15, 16] for privacy
amplification has found various applications in quantum
cryptography. Besides simplifying and improving secu-
rity proofs for quantum key distribution [16, 17], the
quantum version of privacy amplification has been used
to derive both possibility [18] and impossibility [19] re-
sults for tasks such as bit commitment or oblivious trans-
fer.
While the problem of constructing strong extractors is
well-studied, little is known about the security resulting
from their use in a quantum context. For the bounded
storage model, Gavinsky, Kempe and de Wolf [20] re-
cently gave an example of an extractor which yields a
classically secure key, but is completely insecure against
an adversary with a similar amount of quantum storage.
There is no construction for the bounded storage model
that is known to be secure against a quantum adversary.
In this paper, we study properties of strong extrac-
tors in a context where the adversary has quantum in-
formation, with the two cryptographic settings described
in mind. We give the first constructions of extractors
that are usable in the bounded storage model against a
quantum adversary, and we show that certain strong ex-
tractors generate secure key bits in the setting of privacy
amplification. This allows to reduce the amount of com-
munication needed in certain applications. Our construc-
tions achieve the most desirable type of security, that is,
the extracted keys are universally composable [15, 21, 22].
Outline
In Section II we introduce the relevant definitions. In
Section III we show that any strong extractor which out-
puts a single bit yields essentially the same degree of se-
curity in a cryptographic setting, irrespective of whether
the adversary has quantum or classical information. We
then use a hybrid argument in Section IV to obtain ex-
tractors that output several bits. In Section V we explain
how these extractors can be used in the bounded storage
model. Finally, we show that general strong extractors
can be used in the setting of privacy amplification in Sec-
tion VI. We conclude in Section VII.
A. Notation
Throughout this paper, all logarithms are binary,
i.e., to base 2. For a random variable X with
range X , we define the min-entropy of X as H∞(X) :=
− logmaxx PX(x). More generally, for a quantum state
ρQ on a Hilbert spaceQ, H∞(Q) is the min-entropy of the
distribution of eigenvalues of ρQ. Analogously, the max-
entropy is defined as H0(X) := log |supp(PX)| = log |X |
and H0(Q) := log rank(ρQ), respectively. Expressed dif-
ferently, H0(Q) is the number of qubits constituting sys-
tem Q. For a function g : X → R, we denote by
E
x←PX
[g(x)] :=
∑
x∈X
PX(x)g(x)
the expectation of g(X) over a random choice of x← PX .
We also use the notation PX · PY to refer to the joint
distribution of two independent random variables X and
Y , that is, Pr[X = x, Y = y] = PX(x) · PY (y) for all
(x, y) ∈ X × Y.
In the sequel, Q refers to a quantum system, whereas
E, V , W , X , Y and Z are assumed to be classical.
Slightly abusing notation, we sometimes refer to the
Hilbert space corresponding to a classical-quantum state
(cq-state) ρXQ by X ⊗ Q. We denote the completely
mixed state on X by ρUX .
We will sometimes use classical-quantum states with
multipartite classical parts, e.g., a ccq-state ρXY Q. For
such a state ρXY Q, we say that Y ↔ X ↔ Q forms a
Markov chain if it has the form
ρXY Q =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|xy〉〈xy| ⊗ ρx (1)
for some states {ρx}x∈X onQ. A state with this property
defines a distribution PXY , which defines the conditional
distributions PX|Y=y and, for any function f : X × Y →
Z, the distribution Pf(X,Y )XY . The corresponding con-
ditional states ρXQ|Y=y are obtained by making the ap-
proriate replacement in Eq. (1), i.e.,
ρXQ|Y=y =
∑
x
PX|Y=y(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx .
Similarly, we can define the cccq-state
ρf(X,Y )XYQ =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|f(x, y)xy〉〈f(x, y)xy| ⊗ ρx ,
which in turn gives rise to states such as ρf(X,y)XQ|Y=y.
We will use the trace norm ‖A‖ := 12 tr(
√
A†A) for any
operator A. Note that if ρXQ and σX′Q′ are cq-states on
X ⊗Q, then
‖ρXQ − σX′Q′‖ =
∑
x∈X
‖PX(x)ρx − PX′(x)σx‖ . (2)
For two probability distributions P andQ on X , the trace
norm of their difference (when identifying the distribu-
tion with a state), i.e. ‖P −Q‖ := 12
∑
x∈X |P (x)−Q(x)|
is also known as the variational distance.
Let ρXQ =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x|⊗ρx be a cq-state. Con-
sider a fixed POVM E := {Ez}z∈Z on Q. We denote by
PXZ ≡ ρXE(Q) the joint distribution of X and the mea-
surement outcome, i.e.,
PZ|X=x(z) = tr(Ezρx)
for every z ∈ Z and x ∈ X .
3We will often encounter scalar quantities d that are
functions of a given distribution or a quantum state, i.e.,
d = d(PX) or d = d(ρQ). In these cases, we use the short-
hand d(X) or d(Q). Similarly, we write d(Q|W = w)
instead of d(ρQ|W=w). More generally, we will consider
quantities that depend on a specific bipartition of a state
ρZE into Z and E; in these cases, we write d(Z   E).
Again, we use the notation d(Z   E|W = w) to de-
note the corresponding quantity for the conditional state
ρZE|W=w.
II. EXTRACTORS AND SECRET KEYS
A. Classical adversaries
Before reviewing the definition of strong extractors and
various of their basic properties, let us introduce a short-
hand notation for the non-uniformity, a quantity which
measures the extent to which a probability distribution
of a random variable Z deviates from the uniform distri-
bution, possibly given another random variable E:
Definition 1. Let PZE be an arbitrary distribution. The
non-uniformity d(Z   E) of Z given E is defined as
d(Z   E) := ‖PZE − PUZ · PE‖.
Here PE is the marginal distribution of PZE , and PUZ
denotes the uniform distribution on Z.
Note that d(Z) is simply the distance of the distribu-
tion PZ from the uniform distribution. A strong extrac-
tor can then be defined as follows.
Definition 2. A strong (k, ε)-extractor is a function E :
X × Y → Z with the property that
d(E(X,Y )   Y ) = ‖PE(X,Y )Y − PUZ · PUY‖ ≤ ε (3)
for all distributions PX with H∞(X) ≥ k. Here Y is
independent of X and uniformly distributed on Y.
The definition implies that E(X, y) is close to being
uniformly distributed on Z on average over the random
choice of y ← PY (cf. Eq. (A3)). In other words, if X is
chosen according to PX and Y is uniformly distributed
and independent of X , then E(X,Y ) is indistinguishable
from uniform, even given Y .
In a cryptographic setting, the security of the extracted
key Z := E(X,Y ) with respect to an adversary who is
given Y is exactly characterized by Eq. (3). Indeed, ex-
pression (3) quantifies how distinguishable the real sys-
tem (consisting of (Z, Y )) is from the ideal system, in
which Z is uniformly distributed and independent of Y .
This is easily generalized to a setting where the adversary
is given additional information about X . The additional
information can be in the form of a classical random vari-
able (i.e., bits) that is jointly distributed with X or a
quantum state (i.e., qubits).
In case the adversary has classical information about
X expressed by a random variable E, one can show that
this simply reduces the min-entropy of X . If E gives
little information about X it follows that even given E
and Y , the extracted bits look random. This intuition is
made explicit in the following proposition (all proofs in
this section can be found in Appendix B):
Proposition 1. Let E : X × Y → Z be a strong (k, ε)-
extractor. Let PXE be a distribution with
Hg(X   E) ≥ k + log 1/ε . (4)
Here the guessing-entropy Hg(X   E) of X given E is
defined as
Hg(X   E) := − logmax
Xˆ
Pr[X = Xˆ] ,
where the maximum is taken over all random variables
Xˆ such that X ↔ E ↔ Xˆ forms a Markov chain. Then
d(E(X,Y )   Y E) ≤ 2ε ,
where PY XE := PUY · PXE.
Note that if E is trivial or independent of X the guess-
ing entropyHg(X   E) of X given E is equal to the min-
entropy H∞(X) of X . Proposition 1 can be applied in
the bounded storage model because the limitation on the
adversary’s storage implies that his information about X
is bounded. More precisely, the guessing probability has
the following intuitive property. Any (additional) piece
of information W does not increase the success probabil-
ity in guessing by a significant amount if the size of W
is small. More trivially, independent information V does
not affect the guessing probability. We express this for-
mally in Lemma 1; versions of this statement are implicit
in [1], and more explicitly given in [23].
Lemma 1. Consider a distribution PXVWE with PXV =
PX · PV and VW ↔ X ↔ E. Then
Hg(X   VWE) ≥ Hg(X   E)−H0(W ) .
In particular, for every ε ≥ 0,
Hg(X   E|V = v,W = w) ≥ Hg(X   E)−H0(W )−log 1/ε
with probability at least 1− ε over (v, w)← PVW .
B. Quantum adversaries
Let us now discuss the challenge posed by quantum
adversaries. Our aim is to show that, similarly as in the
classical case, the extracted bits E(X,Y ) are secure even
if the adversary is given Y . Such an adversary prepares
a quantum state ρx on Q that depends on X = x. To
obtain maximal information about E(X,Y ), he performs
a measurement on his quantum system Q which depends
4on Y . As a result, his (classical) information E is no
longer independent of Y . This means that we cannot
view this as merely a reduction of the entropy of the
source X . Thus we cannot directly prove a statement
like Lemma 1 when E is replaced by a quantum system
Q. In particular, due to the effect of locking [24], we
know that there exist short classical keys (Y ) that can
unlock a lot of classical information (about X) stored in
a quantum system Q. In the first part of this paper we
will show that if the extractor E extracts a single bit, we
can preclude such locking effect (Theorem III.1).
Before embarking on this analysis, we point out the
following straightforward result. If the adversary’s mea-
surement does not depend on Y we can essentially ap-
ply the classical security proofs. That is, the adver-
sary’s measurement produces some classical information
E which can be viewed as reducing the entropy of the
source X . If the size of the quantum system is suffi-
ciently small, then the random variable E does not give
much information about X and therefore the extracted
bits look random even to such an adversary. These state-
ments are expressed in the following two lemmas.
Note that we can generalize the guessing-entropy of X
given Q to the case where Q is a quantum system. Let
ρXQ :=
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx be a cq-state. Then
Hg(X   Q) := − logmax
E
∑
x∈X
PX(x)tr(Exρx) , (5)
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs E :=
{Ex}x∈X on Q.
We now state the non-adaptive quantum version of
Proposition 1. It is a direct consequence of the reasoning
above.
Proposition 1′. Let E : X × Y → Z be a strong (k, ε)-
extractor, and let F be a POVM on Q. Then for all
cq-states ρXQ with
Hg(X   Q) ≥ k + log 1/ε ,
we have
d(E(X,Y )   Y F(Q)) ≤ 2ε .
The following is the quantum analogue of Lemma 1
(its proof can again be found in Appendix B). It states
that a short additional piece of classical information W
does not help much in guessing X if the quantum system
Q depends only on X . Again, additional independent
information V does not help either.
Lemma 1′. Consider a cccq-state ρXVWQ with ρXV =
ρX ⊗ ρV and VW ↔ X ↔ Q. Then
Hg(X   VWQ) ≥ Hg(X   Q)−H0(W )
and with probability at least 1−ε over (v, w)← PVW , we
have
Hg(X   Q|V = v,W = w) ≥ Hg(X   Q)−H0(W )−log 1/ε .
We now state more precisely what we are aiming to
prove about strong extractors. Note that Lemma 1′ only
gives a weak security guarantee for the extracted bits
E(X,Y ) – they are only shown to be secure against an
adversary who measures his quantum state before receiv-
ing Y . To discuss the stronger type of security we aim
for, we first state the definition of the non-uniformity in
the quantum case.
Definition 3. Let ρZQ be an arbitrary cq-state on Z⊗Q.
The non-uniformity d(Z   Q) of Z given Q is defined as
d(Z   Q) := ‖ρZQ − ρUZ ⊗ ρQ‖ ,
where ρUZ denotes the completely mixed state on Z.
We describe a few basic properties of this definition in
Appendix A. In a cryptographic setting, the condition
d(Z   Q) ≤ ε for some small ε means that the key Z is
secure in a setting whereQ is controlled by the adversary;
as explained in [15] (see also [16, 22]), such a key is, with
probability at least 1−ε, equivalent to a perfectly secure
key.
In the sequel, we aim to show that d(E(X,Y )   Y Q)
is small for certain strong extractors E and appropriate
parameters. This means that the extracted bits are se-
cure even if the adversary is given Y in addition to his
quantum system.
In the next section, we will show that for extractors
with binary output, the quantity of interest can in fact
be bounded by considering an adversary whose strategy
does not depend on Y , i.e., he performs a measurement
independent of Y as in Lemma 1′. We then use this result
in Section IV to construct strong extractors that output
several bits.
III. EXTRACTORS WITH BINARY OUTPUT
We will first sketch the arguments in this section. For
an extractor e : X × Y → {0, 1} with binary output the
non-uniformity of the extracted bit Z = e(X,Y ) given
Y and the quantum system Q can be directly related
to the success probability in distinguishing two quantum
states ρy0 and ρ
y
1 , for each y ∈ Y. For a given y these
are the (generally mixed) states of the adversary, condi-
tioned on the extracted bit being 0 or 1, respectively. We
modify an argument by Barnum and Knill [25] to bound
the optimal success probability in distinguishing ρy0 from
ρy1 for a given y in terms of the success probability re-
sulting from the use of a pretty good measurement [26]
Eypgm. On the other hand, we will show that there exists
a POVM F which refines all the pretty good measure-
ments {Eypgm}y∈Y simultaneously; i.e., the outcome of the
measurement Eypgm can be obtained by applying F and
5classical post-processing. This POVM F is a pretty good
measurement defined by the states {ρx}x∈X , the condi-
tional states ofQ givenX = x, or, in the bounded storage
model, the states that the adversary prepares upon see-
ingX . Since the refined measurement F does not depend
on y, we know that it cannot be superior to any classi-
cal strategy, see Proposition 1′, and we obtain the main
result of this section, Theorem III.1.
In the next lemma we bound the non-uniformity
d(Z   Q) of a cq-state ρZQ :=
∑
z∈{0,1} pz|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρz
with binary classical part using a pretty good measure-
ment.
Lemma 2. Let ρZQ :=
∑
z∈{0,1} pz|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρz be a cq-
state with binary classical part. Then
d(Z   Q) ≤
√
2d(Z   Epgm(Q)) + d(Z) , (6)
where Epgm is the pretty good measurement defined by
ρZQ, i.e. the POVM elements of this measurement are
Ez := pzρ
−1/2
Q ρzρ
−1/2
Q for z ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. By definition
d(Z   Q) =
1∑
z=0
‖pzρz − 1
2
ρQ‖ = ‖p0ρ0 − p1ρ1‖, (7)
Let ∆ := p0ρ0−p1ρ1 and let ∆ =: A+−A− with A+ ≥ 0,
A− ≥ 0 be the decomposition of ∆ into a nonnegative
and a negative part. Then
‖p0ρ0 − p1ρ1‖ = 1
2
(tr(A+) + tr(A−))
= tr(A+)− 1
2
tr(∆)
= tr(P∆)− 1
2
(p0 − p1),
where P is the projector onto the support of A+. We will
do some work to show that
tr(P∆) ≤
√
2d(Z   Epgm(Q)) , (8)
where Epgm is the pretty good measurement that distin-
guishes ρ1 and ρ1. By noting that
−1
2
(p0 − p1) ≤ 1
2
|p0 − p1| ≤ 1
2
(
|p0 − 1
2
|+ |p1 − 1
2
|
)
= d(Z) ,
we obtain the desired result, Eq. (6). Consider thus the
quantity tr(P∆). We can bound
tr(P∆) ≤
√
tr(A†A)tr(B†B) (9)
by applying the operator Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to
the operators
A := ρ
1/4
Q Pρ
1/4
Q
B := ρ
−1/4
Q ∆ρ
−1/4
Q .
But
tr(A†A) = tr(ρ
1/2
Q Pρ
1/2
Q P)
≤ tr(ρ1/2Q Pρ1/2Q )
≤ tr(ρQ) = 1 (10)
where we used the fact that P ≤ 1 and the fact that
ρ
1/2
Q Pρ
1/2
Q is nonnegative. On the other hand, by the def-
inition of the pretty good measurement Epgm = {E0, E1}
we have
tr(B†B) = tr(ρ
−1/2
Q ∆ρ
−1/2
Q ∆)
= tr(E0∆)− tr(E1∆)
= Psucc(Epgm)− p1tr(E0ρ1)− p0tr(E1ρ0)
= 2Psucc(Epgm)− 1 . (11)
Here we have used the definition of the success proba-
bility Psucc({E0, E1}) := p0tr(E0ρ0) + p1tr(E1ρ1), and
the fact that E0 + E1 = 1 and p0 + p1 = 1 in the
last step. Note that probability of success Psucc(E)
for a fixed POVM E is the same as the probability of
successfully distinguishing an instance drawn from the
distribution E(ρ0) and E(ρ1), respectively, with a pri-
ori probabilities p0 and p1. Now we invoke Helstrom’s
theorem [27] which says that the success probability of
distinguishing two quantum states σ0 and σ1 with pri-
ors p0 and p1 using an optimal POVM Eopt is equal
to Psucc(Eopt) = 12 + ‖p0σ0 − p1σ1‖. We apply this
theorem for σz = Epgm(ρz) and write Psucc(Epgm) =
1
2 + d(Z   Epgm(Q)) (cf. Eq. (7)). Combining this with
Eqs. (9), (10) and (11) yields Eq. (8), as desired.
Now the goal is to bound the non-uniformity
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q) for extractors e with binary output
when Q is a quantum system which depends on X . For
this we consider the cccq-state ρZXY Q ≡ ρe(X,Y )XY Q
which has the form
ρZXY Q =
∑
y,x,z=e(x,y)
PX(x)PY (y)|xyz〉〈xyz| ⊗ ρx ,
(12)
where PY (y) =
1
|Y| for every y ∈ Y. For this state one can
express the non-uniformity d(Z   Y Q) as (cf. Eq. (2))
E
y←PY
[ ∑
z∈{0,1}
‖
∑
x
PZ|X=x,Y=y(z)PX(x)ρx −
1
2
ρQ‖
]
.
(13)
Note that PZ|X=x,Y=y(z) is 1 or 0, depending on whether
6or not e(x, y) = z. It is straightforward to verify that
pyzρ
y
z :=
∑
x∈X
PZ|Y=y(z)PX|Y=y,Z=z(x)ρx
=
∑
x∈X
PZ|X=x,Y=y(z)PX(x)ρx , (14)
where we introduced for each y ∈ Y and z ∈ {0, 1} the
density matrix
ρyz :=
∑
x∈X
PX|Y=y,Z=z(x)ρx , (15)
with the normalising factor
pyz := PZ|Y=y(z) = Pr
x←X
[e(x, y) = z] . (16)
The state ρyz is the state of Q conditioned on e(X, y) = z;
for any given y ∈ Y, the two states ρy0 and ρy1 have a priori
probabilities pyz with z ∈ {0, 1}. From this definition, it
is clear that
∑
z
pyzρ
y
z = ρQ , (17)
which is independent of y. This observation will be es-
sential in the proof of the following theorem.
Applying Helstrom’s theorem gives an intuitive inter-
pretation of the quantity of interest (which we state, but
do not need later in the proof): 12 + d(e(X,Y )   Y Q)
is the maximal average success probability when distin-
guishing ρy0 and ρ
y
1 with a priori probabilities p
y
0 and p
y
1,
over random y ← PY . This follows by combining Eq. (17)
with Eq. (13) and Eqs. (15), (16).
We are ready to derive the main result of this section:
Theorem III.1. Let e : X × Y → {0, 1} be a strong
(k, ε)-extractor. Then for all ρXQ with
Hg(X   Q) ≥ k + log 1/ε ,
we have
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ 3√ε ,
where ρY XQ := ρUY ⊗ ρXQ.
Proof. By Eq. (2) (cf. Eq. (A3)) we can express
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q) = E
y←PY
[d(e(X, y)   Q)] . (18)
We can apply the pretty good measurement bound of
Lemma 2 for each y ∈ Y to the state ρe(X,y)Q =∑
z∈{0,1} p
y
z |z〉〈z|⊗ρyz , where the density matrices ρyz and
their associated probabilities pyz are defined in Eqs. (15)
and (16). We get
d(e(X, y)   Q) ≤
√
2d(e(X, y)   Eypgm(Q)) + d(e(X, y))
for every y ∈ Y. Taking the expectation over y ← PY
again and using the convexity of the square root gives
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤
√
E
y←PY
[2d(e(X, y)   Eypgm(Q))]
+ d(e(X,Y )   Y ) (19)
by Eq. (2) (see also Eq. (A2)). Since
H∞(X) ≥ Hg(X   Q) ,
the second term in Eq. (19) is upper bounded by ε. Let
us now consider the details of the pretty good measure-
ment Eypgm. The measurement Eypgm = {Eyz}z∈{0,1} is
determined by the POVM elements
Eyz := p
y
z(G
y)−1/2ρyz(G
y)−1/2 (20)
where, as argued above (Eq. (17)),
Gy =
∑
z∈Z
pyzρ
y
z = ρQ . (21)
is independent of y. This fact allows us to define a new
pretty good measurement F which does not depend on y,
but is equally good or better in estimating Z from Q and
Y . This new pretty good measurement F = {Fx}x∈X
has POVM elements
Fx := PX(x)ρ
−1/2
Q ρxρ
−1/2
Q .
Expressed differently, F is simply the pretty good mea-
surement defined by the ensemble {PX(x), ρx}. From
Eqs. (14), (20) and (21) above one can see that
Eyz =
∑
x∈X
PZ|X=x,Y=y(z)Fx (22)
In other words, the results of the measurements
{Eypgm}y∈Y can in fact be obtained by first estimating x
by measuring the quantum system Q with F = {Fx}x∈X .
Then we infer z for a given y by computing z = e(x, y).
On a more technical level, one needs to show that for ev-
ery y ∈ Y the non-uniformity given the measurement out-
come of the measurement Eypgm is smaller than or equal
to the non-uniformity given the outcome of the refined
measurement F . We have summarized these technical
details in Lemma 6 proved in Appendix C. Formally, we
have
d(e(X, y)   Eypgm(Q)) ≤ d(e(X, y)   F(Q)) .
Taking the expectation over y ← PY gives (cf. Eq. (A3))
E
y←PY
[d(e(X, y)   Eypgm(Q))] ≤ d(e(X,Y )   Y F(Q)) .
Since F does not depend on y we have reduced our prob-
lem to the simple scenario where the quantum system is
measured before the adversary obtains y. Thus we can
7apply Proposition 1′,
d(e(X,Y )   YF(Q)) ≤ 2ε . (23)
We conclude with Eq. (19) that
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ 2√ε+ ε ,
hence the claim follows.
We now show that even if the adversary is given ad-
ditional information V which is independent of X and
a short bit string W which might depend on X , the ex-
tracted bit looks secure. This statement will be used be-
low to prove that certain extractors which output several
bits can also safely be used in a cryptographic context
(cf. Theorem IV.1).
Corollary III.2. Let e : X × Y → {0, 1} be a strong
(k, ε)-extractor. Let ρXVWQ be a cccq-state with ρXV =
ρX ⊗ ρV , VW ↔ X ↔ Q and
Hg(X   Q) ≥ k +H0(W ) + 2 log 1/ε .
Then
d(e(X,Y )   Y VWQ) ≤ 4√ε ,
where ρY XVWQ := ρUY ⊗ ρXVWQ.
Proof. Let α := d(e(X,Y )   Y VWQ) be the quantity of
interest. Then by Eq. (2) (see also Eq. (A2)),
α = E
(v,w)←PV W
[
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q|V = v,W = w)] ,
where the term in brackets is the non-uniformity
of e(X,Y ) with respect to the conditional state
ρXQ|V=v,W=w. By Lemma 1
′, we have
Hg(X   Q|V = v,W = w) ≥ k + log 1/ε (24)
with probability at least 1−ε over random (v, w)← PVW .
For any (v, w) for which Eq. (24) is satisfied, we have
d(e(X,Y )   Y Q|V = v,W = w) ≤ 3√ε
by Theorem III.1. Thus
α ≤ 3√ε+ ε ,
and the claim follows.
IV. EXTRACTORS WITH NONBINARY
OUTPUT
In this section we will consider strong extractors which
output several bits. We first show how to use indepen-
dent seeds y1, . . . , ym to extract m bits. The security of
the extracted bits in the quantum setting will follow from
applying our bound for binary extractors, Theorem III.1
in combination with a quantum version of the so-called
hybrid argument. By a similar technique, we will show
how to extract more bits under stronger assumptions.
Let us first discuss the hybrid argument.
Consider a cq-state of the form ρZQ, where Z =
(Z1, . . . , Zm) is an m-bit string. We aim to find a bound
on d(Z   Q) in terms of non-uniformities of binary ran-
dom variables.
By definition, we have
d(Z   Q) = ‖ρZQ − ρ⊗mU{0,1} ⊗ ρQ‖ .
Let us define for i = 0, . . . ,m the states
ρ(i) := ρ⊗m−iU{0,1} ⊗ ρZiQ
on {0, 1}m ⊗ Q, where we use the abbreviation zi :=
(z1, . . . , zi) to refer to the first i bits of z ∈ {0, 1}m.
Clearly, we have ρ(m) = ρZQ and ρ
(0) = ρ⊗mU{0,1} ⊗ρQ. We
use the “telescoping” sum
ρ(0) − ρ(m) =
m−1∑
i=0
ρ(i) − ρ(i+1) ,
which by the triangle inequality implies that
d(Z   Q) ≤
m−1∑
i=0
‖ρ(i+1) − ρ(i)‖ .
But
‖ρ(i+1) − ρ(i)‖ = ‖ρ⊗m−i−1U{0,1} ⊗ ρZi+1Q − ρ⊗m−iU{0,1} ⊗ ρZiQ‖
= ‖ρZi+1Q − ρU{0,1} ⊗ ρZiQ‖
= ‖ρZi+1ZiQ − ρU{0,1} ⊗ ρZiQ‖
We thus arrive at the following conclusion
d(Z   Q) ≤
m−1∑
i=0
d(Zi+1   Z
iQ) . (25)
Let us now state and prove the main theorem.
Theorem IV.1. Let e : X × Y → {0, 1} be a strong
(k, ε)-extractor, and let
E
m : X × Ym → {0, 1}m
(x, y1, . . . , ym) 7→ (e(x, y1), . . . , e(x, ym)) .
Then for all cq-states ρXQ with
Hg(X   Q) ≥ k +m+ 2 log 1/ε , (26)
we have
d(Em(X,Y m)   Y mQ) ≤ 4m√ε ,
where ρYmXQ := ρUYm ⊗ ρXQ.
8Proof. We use Eq. (25) to get
d(Em(X,Y m)   Y mQ) ≤
m−1∑
i=0
d(Zi+1   Z
iY mQ) ,
(27)
where Zm ≡ Em(X,Y m). Observe that (Yi+2, . . . , Ym) is
independent of Zi+1Y i+1Q, which by Eq. (A4) gives
d(Zi+1   Z
iY mQ) = d(Zi+1   Z
iY i+1Q) . (28)
But
d(Zi+1   Z
iY i+1Q) = d(Zi+1   Yi+1Z
iY iQ)
= d(e(X, Y˜ )   Y˜ Ei(X,Y i)Y iQ)
where Y˜ ≡ Yi+1. Applying Corollary III.2 to (V,W ) =
(Y i,Ei(X,Y i)) yields
d(Zi+1   Z
iY i+1Q) ≤ 4√ε (29)
for every i = 0, . . . ,m− 1. We have made use of the fact
that H0(W ) = H0(E
i(X,Y i)) ≤ m by definition. The
claim then follows from Eqs. (27), (28) and (29).
In the next section, we study the implications of The-
orem IV.1 for the bounded storage model. We will see
that the bound on the storage of the adversary trans-
lates into an upper bound on the guessing probability,
as required (cf. Eq. (26)). We will then give a concrete
example of an extractor for the bounded storage model
with quantum adversaries.
Before continuing, however, let us point out that in cer-
tain situations, we can use the hybrid argument to show
that the seed Y can be reused several times. This gives
more efficient randomness extractors (under stronger as-
sumptions about the inital cq-state ρXQ). Following sim-
ilar terminology in the literature on extractors, we intro-
duce the following notion.
Definition 4. A cq-state ρXQ where X = (X1, . . . , Xm)
consists of m parts is a k-blockwise state if for all i =
0, . . . ,m− 1
Hg(Xi+1   X
iQ) ≥ k .
We will now show how to extract multiple bits from
such a cq-state by reusing the seed. This is interesting
for several reasons. First, k-blockwise states arise natu-
rally in realistic situations such as the bounded storage
model. We will discuss this in more detail below (cf.
Section VC). Second, extractors for k-blockwise proba-
bility distributions are often used to construct (classical)
extractors by transforming the input distribution to a
k-blockwise distribution. It might therefore be possible
to obtain extractor constructions for the quantum case
using similar lines of reasoning.
Theorem IV.2. Let e : X × Y → {0, 1} be a strong
(k, ε)-extractor, and let
E˜
L : XL × Ym → {0, 1}Lm
(x1, . . . , xL, y) 7→ (Em(x1, y), . . . ,Em(xL, y)) ,
where Em : X × Ym → {0, 1}m is defined as in Theo-
rem IV.1. Then
d(E˜L(XL, Y )   Y Q) ≤ 4Lm√ε ,
for all (k+m+2 log 1/ε)-blockwise states ρXQ on XL⊗Q,
where ρYXQ := ρUY ⊗ ρXQ.
Proof. With Eq. (25) we get
d(E˜L(XL, Y )   Y Q) ≤
L−1∑
i=0
d(Zi+1   Z
iY Q) , (30)
where ZL ≡ E˜L(XL, Y ). Since (Zi, Y ) is a function of
(X i, Y ) and since applying functions does not increase
the trace distance, we obtain
d(E˜L(XL, Y )   Y Q) ≤
L−1∑
i=0
d(Zi+1   X
iY Q) . (31)
But d(Zi+1   X
iY Q) = d(Em(Xi+1, Y )   Y X
iQ), and
ρYXi+1XiQ = ρUY ⊗ ρXi+1XiQ. Moreover,
Hg(Xi+1   X
iQ) ≥ k +m+ 2 log 1/ε .
by assumption. Thus we can apply Theorem IV.1 and
the claim follows.
V. THE BOUNDED STORAGE MODEL WITH
A QUANTUM ADVERSARY
A. Bounded storage, guessing entropy and
extractors
In the classical version of the bounded storage model,
the security of the extracted bits is a direct consequence
of the property of the extractor given in Proposition 1
and the fact that an adversary has limited information
about X . The latter fact is expressed by the following
well-known proposition, whose proof we omit, as it is
trivial. It states that an adversary who has H0(E) bits
of storage can not predict X well.
Proposition 2. Let PXE be an arbitrary distribution.
Then
Hg(X   E) ≥ H∞(X)−H0(E) .
Together with Lemma 1, it follows that a strong (k, ǫ)-
extractor has the property that d(e(X,Y )   Y E) ≤ 2ǫ
9for all PXE with
H∞(X) ≥ k +H0(E) + log 1/ε .
Thus the security of the extracted key can be directly
derived from the strong extractor property and the
bounded-storage assumption. The main challenge is to
construct strong extractors which satisfy all the addi-
tional requirements for applicability in the bounded stor-
age model (see Section VB).
What about quantum storage? We show that a similar
reasoning applies; given an extractor which is character-
ized by the guessing-entropy Hg(X   Q), the storage
bound can be translated into a security guarantee. We
first show that X can not be guessed by measuring Q
when the number of qubits constituting Q is limited.
Proposition 2′. Let ρXQ be a cq-state. Then
Hg(X   Q) ≥ H∞(X)−H0(Q) .
Proof. Consider a POVM E := {Ex}x∈X on Q that max-
imizes the expression defining Hg(X   Q) (cf. Eq (5)).
Then
2−Hg(X Q) =
∑
x
PX(x)tr(Exρx)
= tr
((∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex
)
ρXQ
)
≤ 2−H∞(XQ)tr
(∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex
)
.
The statement then follows from the fact that
tr
(∑
x
|x〉〈x| ⊗ Ex
)
= tr
(∑
x
Ex
)
= tr(1Q) = 2
H0(Q) .
By combining Proposition 2′ with Theorem IV.1, we
obtain a way of constructing strong extractors for the
bounded storage model in the presence of quantum ad-
versaries: the statement of Theorem IV.1 holds when
Eq. (26) is replaced by the weaker condition
H∞(X) ≥ k +m+H0(Q) + 2 log 1/ε . (32)
Before applying this result to obtain a concrete construc-
tion, let us elaborate on a recent example which shows
that not every strong extractor yields secure bits in the
quantum bounded storage model.
Remark V.1. Gavinsky, Kempe and de Wolf [20] con-
sider the function
e :{0, 1}n × ωn → {0, 1}
((x1, . . . , xn), {y1, y2}) 7→ xy1 ⊕ xy2 ,
where ⊕ denotes bitwise addition modulo 2 and where
ωn is the set of pairs (y1, y2) of distinct indices y1, y2 ∈
{1, . . . , n}. They then study the function Em restricted
to the set {0, 1}n × Ωm, where Ωm ⊂ ωmn is the sub-
set of disjoint m-tuples. Let us call this restriction
E˜m and let Y˜m be uniform on Ωm. In our termi-
nology, they show the following. There is an α ≈
1/
√
logn such that for large enough n and m := αn,
the quantity d(E˜m(X, Y˜m)   Y˜mE) is small for any clas-
sical random variable E with H0(E) ≤
√
n, whereas
d(E˜m(X, Y˜m)   Y˜mQ) is large if Q is quantum and
H0(Q) is polylogarithmic in n.
This statement does not contradict Theorem IV.1
which can not be applied in this situation. This is be-
cause the function E˜m does not have the required form.
While Theorem III.1 tells us that the difference between
classical and quantum prior information is limited in the
case of extractors with binary output, this example shows
that the case of general extractors which output several
bits is more subtle.
B. Extractors for the bounded storage model: an
explicit example
In this section, we give a concrete example of a func-
tion E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m which can be used in
the bounded storage model in the presence of a quantum
adversary. Let us first discuss what additional require-
ments such a function has to satisfy.
Typical parameters of the bounded storage model are
as follows: For some 1 ≥ α > β > 0, H∞(X) ≥ αn
and H0(Q) ≤ βn. Here, the parameter α is called the
min-entropy rate, whereas β is referred to as the storage
rate. The amount of memory available to the honest par-
ties, Alice and Bob, on the other hand, is supposed to be
much more limited. Typically, it is assumed that they
have only O(log n) bits of storage. Expressed differently,
the scheme should be secure even if the adversary is sig-
nificantly more powerful than the participating honest
parties.
The fact that Alice and Bob have only O(log n) bits of
memory implies that the strong extractor must have seed
length log |Y| = t of that order. Moreover, the extractor
has to be (efficiently) computable with limited memory.
This is the case if E is ℓ-local, meaning that it only de-
pends on a small number ℓ (instead of n) physical bits
of its first argument, where the ℓ bit locations are de-
termined by the second argument. Note that a different
solution to the latter problem was suggested by Lu [11],
who considers so-called on-line computable functions.
Due to these requirements, finding explicit, efficiently
computable constructions for the bounded-storage model
is a rather intricate problem, which has been studied for
some time [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Here we consider a con-
struction by Vadhan. By choosing the output to be a
single bit, Theorem 8.5 in [12] gives an ℓ-local strong
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(k, ε)-extractor e : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} with
t = logn+O(log 1/ε) (33)
ℓ =
3
2
n
k
+O(log 1/ε) (34)
for every ε > exp(−n/2O(log∗ n)).
Suppose we want to achieve an error ε, using The-
orem IV.1. Then the error for the one-bit-extractor e
must be upper bounded by (ε/4m)2. Inserting this into
Eqs. (33) and (34) gives
Corollary V.2. For any ε > 4m exp(−n/2O(log∗ n)),
there is an ℓ-local function
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m ,
with
t = m logn+O(m logm+m log 1/ε)
ℓ =
3
2
nm
k −m− 2 log 1/ε +O(m logm+m log 1/ε) ,
such that d(E(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ ε for all ρXQ with
H∞(X)−H0(Q) ≥ k ,
where ρY XQ = ρU
{0,1}d
⊗ ρXQ.
In terms of the min-entropy rate α and the storage-
rate β, our result implies that for any α > β, there is
an extractor which uses O(m logn + m log 1/ε) bits of
initial key, outputs m bits with security ε, and reads
O(m logm +m log 1/ε) bits from the randomizer X . In
comparison, the best known classical construction uses
O(log n + log 1/ε) bits of key and reads O(m + log 1/ε)
from X .
C. Independent randomizers
In the so-called satellite scenario [8], the randomizer
X is assumed to consist of a sequence of random bits
that are publicly broadcast in sequence. In this sit-
uation, it is clear that if we partition X into blocks
X = (X1, . . . , XL), the random variables corresponding
to the blocks are independent. What is more interesting
is that if the adversary is allowed to prepare a quantum
system Q adaptively, the resulting cq-state ρXQ is a k-
blockwise state. This is a consequence of the fact that
taking the previous blocks X i into account when stor-
ing and retrieving information about Xi+1 does not help
the adversary if Xi+1 is independent of X
i. We can ex-
press this formally by the following result, with the set S
corresponding to all states on a Hilbert space of limited
dimension in the bounded storage model.
Lemma 3. Let PXX′ = PX · PX′ be a probability dis-
tribution of independent random variables and let S be a
set of states. Then
min
ρXX′Q
Hg(X   X
′Q) ≥ min
ρXQ
Hg(X   Q) , (35)
where the minima are over all states of the form
ρXX′Q =
∑
x,x′
PXX′(x, x
′)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |x′〉〈x′| ⊗ ρx′x
with ρx
′
x ∈ S and
ρXQ =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx , ρx ∈ S ,
respectively.
Proof. Let {ρx′x }x,x′ be a family of states such that the
corresponding state ρXX′Q achieves the minimum on the
l.h.s. of Eq. (35). Then
2−Hg(X X
′Q) = E
x′←PX′
[2−Hg(X Q|X
′=x′)] .
But
2−Hg(X Q|X
′=x′) = max
{Ex}x
∑
x∈X
PX(x)tr(Exρ
x′
x )
= 2−Hg(X Q) ,
where the latter expression denotes the guessing entropy
of X given Q in the state
ρx
′
XQ =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx
′
x .
The claim directly follows from this.
If the randomizer X consists of several independent
parts X = (X1, . . . , XL) which satisfy H∞(Xi) ≥
H0(Q) + k for all i, we can therefore use our hybrid
construction (Theorem IV.2) in conjunction with Corol-
lary V.2. As an example, consider the case where each
of the blocks Xi consists of n bits with min-entropy rate
α. We then obtain an extractor E : {0, 1}Ln × {0, 1}t →
{0, 1}Lm which uses t = mO(log n+ logL+ log 1/ε) bits
of initial key, reads mO(logm+logL+log 1/ε) bits from
X and gives an ε-secure output in the presence of an
adversary with storage rate β < α. In particular, this
construction can extend the key of the honest parties by
more than the number of initial key bits. This implies
that Alice and Bob end up with a longer key even if the
adversary later learns the initial key Y .
VI. TOMOGRAPHY-BASED APPROACH TO
GENERAL EXTRACTORS
The results of Section III imply that the security of a
single extracted bit is similar with respect to an adversary
that has quantum instead of classical resources.
11
This is not true for general extractors which output
several bits, as shown in [20] by an explicit counterex-
ample. It is however possible to give constructions that
extract multiple bits in a useful way, as we have shown
in the previous section.
Which constructions give rise to “useful” extractors in
a quantum context? In this section, we elaborate on
this question, showing that general extractors can be
used in the setting of privacy amplification, if the ad-
versary’s memory is limited. Note that the setting of
privacy amplification imposes less stringent requirements
on the extractor than the setting of the bounded-storage
model. Nevertheless, the only construction known to
work in the quantum setting has been two-universal hash-
ing [13, 14, 15, 16].
While two-universal hashing has the advantage that
it extracts all the randomness present in the source
(i.e., the number of extracted bits can be as large as
H∞(X) − 2 log 1/ε), it requires a long seed Y . Viewed
as an extractor, two-universal hashing has the form E :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, i.e., the seed is of the same
length as the source X . When applied to privacy ampli-
fication, this means that n bits need to be communicated
from Alice to Bob. We will show below that by consider-
ing general extractors the amount of communication can
be reduced to approximately the number of qubits the
adversary controls. This is important for applications
such as the protocols proposed in [18].
We use a measurement-based approach, which bounds
the trace distance in terms of the outcomes of a tomo-
graphic measurement in mutually unbiased bases. More
precisely, we will use the following lemma, whose proof
is analogous to a proof in [24].
Lemma 4. Let A be a hermitian operator on Q, where
d := dimQ = pn is a prime power. Then there is POVM
F such that
‖A‖ ≤ (d+ 1) · ‖F(A)‖ .
We can then show the following:
Lemma 5. Let E : X × Y → Z be a strong (k, ε)-
extractor. Then
d(E(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ 4 · 2H0(Q) · ε , (36)
for all cq-states ρXQ with
Hg(X   Q) ≥ k + log 1/ε ,
and 2Ho(Q) = pm for some prime p.
Remark VI.1. We point out that the condition on the
dimension of Q can easily be dropped by using a different
measurement than the one described in Lemma 4, at the
cost of introducing an additional constant in the exponent
on the r.h.s. of Eq. (36).
Proof. By definition and Eq. (2),
d(E(X, y)   Q) =
∑
z∈Z
‖PE(X,y)(z)ρzy −
1
|Z|ρQ‖ ,
where ρzy is the conditional state ρ
z
y := ρQ|E(X,y)=z for all
(y, z) ∈ Y × Z. By Lemma 4, we get
d(E(X, y)   Q)
≤ 2Ho(Q)+1
∑
z∈Z
‖PE(X,y)(z)F(ρzy)−
1
|Z|F(ρQ)‖ ,
and thus by taking the expectation over y ← PY with
Eq. (2) (see also Eq. (A3))
d(E(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ 2Ho(Q)+1 d(E(X,Y )   Y F(Q)) .
The claim then follows from Proposition 1′.
This lemma shows that in principle, any strong (k, ε)-
extractor with suitable parameters can be used for pri-
vacy amplification. We illustrate this using a construc-
tion by Srinivasan and Zuckerman [28] for simplicity, but
we point out that using constructions from [29], it is
possible to reduce the randomness required for privacy
amplification even further. They give an efficiently com-
putable strong (k, ε)-extractor E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t →
{0, 1}m for any k,m, ε with k ≥ m+2 log 1/ε+ 2, where
t = 2(k + m) + O(log n). Applying this to a situation
where the adversary is given at most d ≥ H0(Q) qubits
of storage, we obtain an efficiently computable function
E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m which uses only
t = 4(d+m+ log 1/ε+ 3) +O(log n)
bits of seed and satisfies d(E(X,Y )   Y Q) ≤ ε whenever
H∞(X) ≥ m+ 4d+ 3 log 1/ε+ 8 .
For certain parameters, this construction is more efficient
in terms of the seed length t than the local extractor
described in Corollary V.2.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
While Holevo’s celebrated theorem implies that n
quantum bits can not be used to store more than n classi-
cal bits reliably, this result is in general not applicable in
cryptography, where even partial information can make a
difference. Indeed, numerous examples are known where
quantum bits are more powerful than the same number
of classical bits (see e.g., [14, 20, 30, 31]). In this light,
it is natural to study the potential advantage offered by
quantum information with respect to specific tasks.
We have taken a step in this direction by showing that
certain schemes for the bounded storage model which are
secure in the presence of classical adversaries are also se-
cure in the presence of adversaries who are in control of
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quantum storage. Surprisingly, the corresponding secu-
rity parameters are almost the same for the quantum and
the classical case when only a single bit is extracted. It is
straightforward to extend and reformulate this result in
terms of communication complexity. It then states that
there can not be a large separation between the one-way
average-case quantum and classical communication com-
plexities of a boolean function.
This is in sharp contrast to the case of extractors which
output several bits. There are extractors that provide
security in the classical bounded-storage model, but can
not safely be used against quantum adversaries [20]. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to give a family of constructions
that yield secure bits; this is our main contribution.
While our extractors provide security against quantum
adversaries, their parameters are far from optimal. Fu-
ture work can focus on improving these constructions.
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APPENDIX A: PROPERTIES OF THE
NONUNIFORMITY
We summarize a few properties of the non-uniformity
in this section.
The non-uniformity d(Z   W ) of Z given W can be
viewed as the average distance of the conditional distri-
bution PZ|W=w to the uniform distribution, for a random
choice of w ← PW , that is
d(Z   W ) = E
w←PW
[d(Z|W = w)] (A1)
More generally, for a ccq-state ρZWQ, where W and Q
are not necessarily independent, the non-uniformity of
Z given WQ can be written as an average of the corre-
sponding non-uniformities with respect to the conditional
states ρZQ|W=w . This is a direct consequence of Eq. (2).
In formula, we have
d(Z   WQ) = E
w←PW
[d(Z   Q|W = w)] . (A2)
In particular, we can write
d(E(X,Y )   Y Q) = E
y←PUY
[d(E(X, y)   Q|Y = y)] ,
(A3)
where the term in brackets is equal to d(E(X, y)   Q)
when Y and Q are independent (which is usually the
case in this paper).
Finally, we point out that conditioning on indepen-
dent random variables leaves the non-uniformity invari-
ant, that is
d(Z   V Q) = d(Z   Q) , (A4)
if ρZQV = ρZQ ⊗ ρV . This follows from Eq. (A2).
APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF SECTION II
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a random variable Xˆ
defined by a channel PXˆ|E which takes a value xˆ for
which PX|E=e(xˆ) = 2
−H∞(X|E=e) with certainty, for ev-
ery e ∈ E . Clearly, we have
2−Hg(X E) = Pr[X = Xˆ] = E
e←PE
[
2−H∞(X|E=e)
]
.
By Markov’s inequality and Eq. (4), this implies that
Pr
e←PE
[
H∞(X |E = e) ≤ Hg(X   E)− log 1/ε
] ≤ ǫ .
The result then follows by convexity, using the fact that
d(E(X,Y )   Y E) = E
e←PE
[d(E(X,Y )   Y |E = e)] be-
cause of Eq. (A1).
Lemma 1 can be seen as a special case of Lemma 1′.
Their proofs are analogous, but we include both here, as
the classical proof is instructive for the quantum gener-
alization.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let av,w := 2
−Hg(X E|V=v,W=w) for
all (v, w) ∈ V ×W . By definition,
av,w =
∑
e∈E
PE|V=v,W=w(e)max
x∈X
PX|E=e,V=v,W=w(x) .
In particular,
PVW (v, w)av,w =
∑
e∈E
PEVW (e, v, w)max
x∈X
PX|E=e,V=v,W=w(x)
=
∑
e∈E
max
x∈X
PXEVW (x, e, v, w)
But by summing over w ∈ W
PXEVW (x, e, v, w) ≤ PXEV (x, e, v)
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and thus
PVW (v, w)av,w ≤ PV (v)
∑
e∈E
PE|V=v(e)max
x∈X
PX|V=v,E=e(x)
= PV (v)
∑
e∈E
PE(e)max
x∈X
PX|E=e(x)
= PV (v)2
−Hg(X E)
where we used the independence of XE and V in the
second step and the definition of Hg(X   E) to obtain
the last identity. We conclude that
E
(v,w)←PV W
[av,w] ≤ 2H0(W )−Hg(X E)
It is easy to see that
E
(v,w)←PV W
[av,w] = 2
−Hg(X VWE),
which proves our first claim. We then use Markov’s in-
equality to obtain
Pr
(v,w)←PV W
[
av,w ≥ 1
ε
2H0(W )−Hg(X E)
]
≤ ε ,
which is our second claim.
Proof of Lemma 1′. By assumption, ρXVWQ has the
form
ρXVWQ =
∑
(x,v,w)∈X×V×W
PXVW (xvw)|xvw〉〈xvw| ⊗ ρx .
For every (v, w) ∈ V ×W , let Ev,w := {Ev,wx }x∈X be the
POVM which maximizes the expression in the definition
of Hg(X   Q|V = v,W = w). We define the operators
{F vx }x∈X by
F vx := 2
−H0(W )
∑
w∈W
Ev,wx .
It is easy to see that Fv := {F vx }x∈X forms a POVM
for every v ∈ V , and the operator inequality Ev,wx ≤
2H0(W )F vx holds. In particular,
tr(Ev,wx ρx) ≤ 2H0(W )tr(F vx ρx) (B1)
for all (x, v, w) ∈ X × V × W . Let us introduce the
abbreviation
av,w := 2
−Hg(X Q|V=v,W=w) . (B2)
for every (v, w) ∈ V ×W . By definition and Eq. (B1),
av,w =
∑
x∈X
PX|V=v,W=w(x)tr(E
v,w
x ρx)
≤ 2H0(W )
∑
x∈X
PX|V=v,W=w(x)tr(F
v
x ρx) .
We thus have
E
(v,w)←PV W
[av,w] ≤ 2H0(W )
∑
(x,v)∈X×V
PXV (x, v)tr(F
v
x ρx)
= 2H0(W ) E
v←PV
[∑
x∈X
PX|V=v(x)tr(F
v
x ρx)
]
.
(B3)
But for every v ∈ V ,
∑
x∈X
PX|V=v(x)tr(F
v
x ρx) =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)tr(F
v
x ρx)
≤ 2−Hg(X Q) (B4)
by the assumption that ρXV = ρX ⊗ ρV , and the def-
inition of the latter quantity. Combining Eqs. (B4)
with (B3) and (B2) gives
2−Hg(X VWQ) = E
(v,w)←PV W
[av,w] ≤ 2H0(W )−Hg(X Q) ,
and the first claim follows. The second claim follows from
Markov’s inequality, as in the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF REFINEMENT
LEMMA
In the proof of Theorem III.1 we have used the fact that
applying classical post-processing after a measurement F
does not increase the non-uniformity. We state this as a
lemma; the proof is trivial and follows from the triangle
inequality.
Lemma 6. Let PE|X be a channel, and let F :=
{Fx}x∈X be a POVM on Q. Define the operators
Ee :=
∑
x∈X
PE|X=x(e)Fx
for every e ∈ E. Then E := {Ee}e∈E is a POVM, and
for any cq-state ρZQ,
d(Z   E(Q)) ≤ d(Z   F(Q)).
Proof. It is trivial to check that E is indeed a POVM. By
definition,
d(Z   E(Q)) = ‖ρZE(Q) − ρUZ ⊗ ρE(Q)‖
=
1
2
∑
(z,e)∈Z×E
αz,e , (C1)
where
αz,e := ‖tr((|z〉〈z| ⊗ Ee)ρZQ)− 1|Z| tr(EeρQ)‖ .
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By the definition of Ee and the triangle inequality,
αz,e ≤
∑
x∈X
PE|X=x(e)‖tr((|z〉〈z|⊗Fx)ρZQ)−
1
|Z| tr(FxρQ)‖ .
Combining this with Eq. (C1) gives the claim.
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